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“Today we’ll try to figure out what’s wrong with Russia from the western point of view?” That’s the beginning of an interview by Al Gurnov (Russia TV) with Lord Robert Skidelsky. The interview is about 26 minutes long, but in the middle of it at least 5 minutes are spent on plugging Russia TV in a form of a long commercial, so you can skip that part once you get there. Here is my selected commentary:
Russia doesn’t seem to appreciate the importance of “soft power,” the ability to attract people to its point of view.
Yes and no. While Russia is often rather clumsy in solving international disputes in a diplomatic manner which if it did would enhance its reputation, Moscow in fact is very aware of the importance that “soft power” holds. Testimony to this is an entire government department (if I’m not mistaken under Ministry of Foreign Affairs) whose sole focus is on projecting soft power by, for example, promoting Russian cultural events.
The tone [in foreign policy] is often truculent…and also there is this paranoia.
This supports the above point about the failure to attract using soft power. Clearly this is not always the case, but the pugnacious attitude and overt paranoia based on the idea that the West-is-out-to-get-us (not necessarily believed by all elites, but undeniably propagated by the government in Moscow) is well documented in officials transcripts.
Around 6-7 minute, Skidelsky says something along the lines of: in terms of getting Russia durable partnerships, allies, members of the important organizations, Putin’s foreign policy has been a disaster.
The TV anchor counters with Russia’s G8 membership. Skidelsky yields, but points out that it was a political move, and economically Russia does not qualify for membership. But then he undercuts his argument further by citing examples of organizations which Russia failed to join thus far: WTO, NATO, the EU.
True, the first one is an example of Putin’s failure, but Russia was never a serious contender for NATO either from Moscow’s or Brussels’ point of view. There is a bigger chance for the EU membership, but not by much. And realistically, no Russian president would have been able to get a membership in either of these organizations in 8 years.
Robert Skidelsky
Presumably Skidelsky would argue that Putin could have steered Russia closer to these organizations, on the likes of how West Germany was reintegrated in post-WWII period into the western framework.
Having opposed wars in Kosovo and Iraq, Skidelsky insists that it still pays off to play by the rules on the world stage (to the disagreement of Gurnov who cites the U.S. as the rule breaker).
Skildelsky also makes an interesting point (around 9m) about Russia having few allies. According to him, Serbia would like to be a satellite again. China is a marriage of convenience, and Central Asian states would fall in the same category. But aside from these no one else buys Russia’s story of its role in the world or of the wrongs it perceives done to it.
“They don’t buy it.” It is a failure of foreign policy, argues Skidelsky, failure to make Russia attractive to others.
He cites examples of former Soviet states or satellites who have by now joined NATO, and Ukraine and Georgia who have submitted their applications to join the North Atlantic Alliance. Skidelsky argues that this is because Russia has failed to make its foreign policy position more attractive or competitive vis-a-vis the other side (i.e. the west).
Around 11:25 minute, Skidelsky argues that it was a mistake not to let Russia in NATO after 9/11. I’m not sure this view is shared by most commentators. How is one supposed to admit a country into NATO without any groundwork or preparation without destabilizing the Alliance.
A typical membership involves a long process beginning with the Partnership for Peace program to the Membership Action Plan to actual accession. Even assuming that NATO would have given Russia a MAP at the end of 2001, this plan would have been in shatters by late 2002 as divisions arose between the U.S. policy toward Iraq and Russia’s opposition to it.
[A Commercial Break]
The video resumes around 14:40m. Discussing the Litvinenko case, Skidelsky says: “Once the two sides start standing on their dignity the dialog stops.” Aside from being applicable to international relations, this applies in day-to-day interactions between people.
Who murdered Litvinenko, according to Gurnov, is not important? (18:20m) I’ve heard this line before – that other grand national interests should not be trumped by a murder of one person. The problem is how this was done (radioactive poison), and that in the process hundreds of other British citizens were endangered, not to mention a host of other moral and legal issues involved.
If you’re interested in a discussion about whether this is a New Cold War, forward ahead to 20:30m. Skidelsky thinks no; some think yes (e.g. Edward Lucas 21:12m). A better explanation for the state of affairs between Russia and the West, argues Skidelsky, is “Cold War of the mind” (21:30m).
Around 22:40m, Gurnov asks what’s Russia doing wrong?
Skidelsky’s reply: Russia mishandles the energy disputes; it claims to be a democracy, but is not. This frustrates western countries. The last two minutes of the interview are devoted to the discussion of what kind of political system can/should Russia have. This will be of interest to those looking at democracy and Russia.
